INTRODUCTION
Because eliminating nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from North Korea will require a multilateral effort, the policies and interests of North Korea's neighbors must be taken into account. This paper examines how these neighboring states might react to the four generic options that the United States can exercise: continued hostile containment, dialogue and negotiation, economic sanctions, and military pressure. NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR CARD As long as North Korea's Kim Jong-il regime does not irrevocably abandon its nuclear option, that option can be used to negotiate for inducements in a succession of agreements. North Korea's nuclear and missile programs also may provide a profitable commodity to sell in the international marketplace. The consensus among those who have studied the North Koreans closely is that they would never completely give up their nuclear weapons program. sanctions on North Korea, China would officially oppose the move, at least under present circumstances. As for a preemptive strike on North Korean nuclear installations by US forces, it is hard to imagine any situation under which the Chinese would approve.
THE LOGIC OF NORTH KOREA'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

US POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA
Russia
Although Russia desires to play a role in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, it is not because the Russians feel threatened by a North Korean nuclear attack.
Like China, Russia has urged the United States to engage in dialogue with North Korea to reach a compromise solution. It is too early to tell if a US-led sanction regime against North Korea would find much support in Russia, which in any case has little trade with
North Korea, and Russia has given no indication that it would support a US preemptive attack on North Korea, although neither would it be likely to offer an embattled North Korea any military assistance.
Japan
In Japan, the level of public concern over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs continues to grow, although public opinion, which is more conservative than elite opinion, has hardly begun to consider the option of increasing Japan's military strength. The Japanese government's position, shared by most Japanese, is that the country would not abandon its "three nuclear principles" of not manufacturing, possessing, or deploying nuclear weapons, even if North Korea declared itself to be a nuclear power. If the United States imposes economic sanctions on North Korea, the Japanese may join in. Given the strong pacifist mood of the Japanese people, and the vulnerability of Japan to North Korean attack, it is unlikely that Japan would support a US preemptive attack on North Korea or agree beforehand to allow US bases in Japan to be used in such an attack. 
South Korea
THE LOGIC OF NORTH KOREA'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
North Korea is economically weak and militarily strong. Its economic weakness is caused by the failure of a socialist command economy and by the financial drain of supporting a large military. The Kim Jong-il regime needs a strong military to deter potential aggressors (of which there have been many in Korea's long history) and control the civilian population. The weaker the economy, the more vulnerable the regime is to foreign aggression and to a dissatisfied citizenry, and therefore the more important is the regime's avowed "military first" policy.
The socialist economy, in turn, cannot be abandoned or substantially modified for at least three reasons. First, socialism is an inherent part of the regime's ideology, and the principal rationale for the existence of North Korea as a state separate from South Korea.
Second, North Korea must remain socialist because the regime needs the power of central command over the economy to control the population. Third, the regime does not know how to run a capitalist economy.
In the absence of a viable civilian export economy, military exports-especially WMD-can serve at least two economic purposes: direct sales to other countries or subnational groups, and "blackmailing" foreign governments into providing economic aid. 
NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PATH
NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR CARD
It is important to ask whether, in return for inducements, the Kim regime is now or ever was willing to relinquish its capacity to produce nuclear weapons material. A powerful argument in favor of the North's relinquishing nuclear capabilities is that so what the President was saying yesterday is that we are going to take our time, we're going to put together a comprehensive policy, and in due course, at a time and at a pace of our choosing, we will decide and determine how best to engage with the North Korean regime." In the following sections, the evolving positions of China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia will be examined in terms of the degree to which each is concerned about a 
China
China's concern over North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles is low-at least compared to the concern shown by South Korea, Japan, and the United States. But
Chinese concern is unquestionably growing. It is difficult to imagine any circumstances under which the DPRK would use such weapons against China, although at least one Chinese commentator has suggested that "it is not impossible that China may be confronted with nuclear blackmail [from North Korea] over some issue one day." 7 China's greater concern is that a North Korean nuclear weapons capability might provoke Japan, South Korea, or even Taiwan to acquire the same.
8
Perhaps of greatest concern to China is that North Korean nuclear weapons might invite a preemptive American attack on North Korea, triggering a war that would bring more American troops into northeast Asia and send fleeing North Korean troops and refugees into northern China. The outcome of total war would be either a no-man's land of destruction in North Korea or a united Korea under the government of the ROK, still allied with the United States. For China, one advantage of tolerating a trouble-making North Korea is that China's purported influence over the Pyongyang government can provide diplomatic leverage for dealing with South Korea, Japan, and the United States.
Thus, a settlement of the nuclear issue is desirable for China, but not urgent. 
Japan
Japan's concern over North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities is high. For some years, North Korea's Nodong missiles have been able to target any point in Japan, but Japanese public concern about the North Korean missile threat was not galvanized until the North launched an intercontinental-range rocket that flew over Japan in August 1998. Pending the development of a highly effective anti-missile system, the Japanese have no defense against North Korean medium-and long-range missiles. Japan is vulnerable as well to North Korean sea-borne commando raids.
The Japanese also are concerned about a possible flow of North Korean refugees into Japan, although few have yet arrived. Some of the refugees might come by boat across the East Sea (Sea of Japan). Japan would also be a natural refuge for the 93,000 former Korean residents of Japan who emigrated to North Korea in the late 1950s and early 1960s, along with their descendants and their 1,800 Japanese wives. In Japan, the level of public concern over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs continues to grow, although public opinion, which is more conservative than elite opinion, has hardly begun to consider the option of increasing Japan's military strength. In January 2003, just after North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT, the latest in a series of triennial polls conducted by the Japanese Cabinet found that 43 percent of Japanese thought Japan could be drawn into a war (up from 30 percent three years earlier), and another 37 percent considered war a possibility. 36 This is the largest proportion of concerned responses since the polling was begun in 1975. In northern Japan, over-flown by a North Korean rocket in 1998, concern was even higher. Overall, the North Korean threat was mentioned by 75 percent of respondents. Yet 62 percent considered that the defense budget was adequate, and only 15 percent favored a boost in defense spending.
The possibility of revising Japan's "peace constitution" to permit a more active military stance has been broached for years, but the public has never gotten behind calls for a change. Since 1976, the Japanese Defense Agency's (JDA) "concept of basic defense" has been "possessing the minimum defense capability necessary for an independent country." In April 2003, the JDA decided to revise the 1995 policy along the lines of replacing "possessing the minimum defense capability" with "coping with new threats," although a more detailed policy has yet to be worked out. 37 What has been accomplished, ever so slowly, is to pass legislation to make it easier to deploy JDA forces and handle national emergencies. 38 In 1992, a bill was passed to permit Japanese forces to Although the Japanese government's position is that the country would not abandon its "three nuclear principles" of not manufacturing, possessing, or deploying nuclear weapons, even if North Korea declared itself to be a nuclear power, 42 the nuclear option does receive occasional mention by people outside the government. 43 The arguments against a nuclear arsenal are strong. First, it would violate the three nonnuclear principles that have become enshrined in Japanese politics (although not in the constitution). It also might violate the constitutional prohibition against Japan's engaging in collective defense. It would be a violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and make Japan the target of anger and suspicion throughout Asia. But on more practical grounds, it has been argued that Japan is so vulnerable to North Korean nuclear attack that retaliation, while inflicting some damage on North Korea, would do nothing to save the country.
44
The US-Japan security alliance is still counted as the main deterrent to foreign aggression. In 2003, the Koizumi administration offered to provide non-combat support for the second war on Iraq, even though approximately 80 percent of the Japanese people opposed the US-led war. 45 The rationale for Koizumi's decision was that Japan needed US protection against a growing North Korean threat, and this argument was accepted by the majority of the Japanese public. At about the same time, talk in Washington about redeploying US troops back from the DMZ in South Korea (interpreted by some as a reduction in the US commitment to protect South Korea) caused some Japanese to wonder whether the US commitment to the defense of Japan might undergo a similar review. Japan is also concerned that strains in US-ROK relations caused by divergent
North Korea policies will undermine the US-Japan-ROK regional alliance structure that has helped deter North Korea in the past.
46
Given the heightened threat of North Korean missiles and nuclear weapons, the value of the US-Japan security alliance has increased for most Japanese, as illustrated by Japanese acquiescence to sending non-combat troops to support a highly unpopular war.
In the words of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, who has been closely involved in dealing with North Korea, Japan is the "shield" and the United States is the "sword" when it comes to Japan's defense. But the Japanese are constantly puzzling over what is the shield and what is the sword; or to put it plainly, where Japan should draw the line on an "exclusively defense-oriented posture." 47 For example, Abe suggested that if
North Korea should threaten to turn Tokyo into a "sea of fire" (a popular North Korean threat) and simultaneously began fueling their missiles (those that do not use solid fuel), the dual actions might be regarded as an attack in progress against which Japan could legitimately launch a counterattack. The possibility of building light aircraft carriers or developing cruise missiles has even been mentioned in this connection.
48
Japan is North Korea's second largest trading partner, after China, with total trade of $370 million in 2002. 49 In some past years, Japan has also been one of the largest food aid donors to North Korea, although, despite North Korean requests, Japan has not Korea but by the United States. Therefore, to prevent such an occurrence, a ban could be imposed on North Korea. 53 For its part, the North Korean government has warned that economic sanctions from Japan will elicit a strong counteraction.
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As a second economic step, the Japanese government has begun to institute more strict inspections of the North Korean freighters that frequently visit Japanese ports (over a thousand visits a year). Since early 2003, thanks to more strict port inspections, several North Korean ships have been turned away from or detained in Japanese ports, including the large passenger and freight ferry, the Mangyongbong, which makes regular port calls to conduct business with the North Korean community in Japan. The government officials who favor a more hawkish stand against North Korea, both in military and economic terms, are younger members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, including the JDA minister, Shigeru Ishiba, and the deputy cabinet minister, Shinzo Abe. 55 The Japanese public, which is adopting an increasingly negative attitude toward North Korea, seems to be getting behind the idea of imposing sanctions.
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What is the Japanese view of Washington's North Korea policy? Despite US reluctance to agree to high-level bilateral meetings with North Korea, the Japanese have continued to make attempts to establish dialogue with North Korea, but so many issues separate the two countries that it is hard to be optimistic about a near-term positive Japan or testing a nuclear device. 57 Given Japan's peace constitution, the strong pacifist mood of the Japanese people, and the vulnerability of Japan to North Korean attack, it is unlikely that Japan would support a US preemptive attack on North Korea or agree beforehand to allow US bases in Japan to be used in such an attack.
South Korea
South Koreans show relatively little fear of North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles, which is surprising considering the proximity of North Korea, the frequency and magnitude of its threats against South Korea, and the experience of the Korean War.
There is a noticeable divide in public opinion between the older generations-who recall South Korea is becoming alienated from the US-Japan campaign to pressure North Korea to relinquish its nuclear program, Yi replied: "Such an expression would be appropriate if we desired to join in the effort and were refused, but we do not wish to do so." The head of the unification ministry, Chong Se-hyon, also favors engagement with North Korea. were launched, even from offshore, it would seriously jeopardize, if not terminate, the US-ROK security alliance.
US OPTIONS REVISITED
The nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula continues to evolve. Important states that favor negotiation are essentially saying that they are willing to live with the possibility of a residual North Korean nuclear weapons capability, even though the government of every one of these governments has insisted that North Korean nuclear weapons can never be tolerated. Either these countries are willing to turn a blind eye to such a program, or they are willing to live with North Korean nuclear weapons for years to come, in the hope that the weapons will some day be abandoned. 
